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Abstract
We examine information structure design, also called “persuasion” or “signaling,” in the
presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting
of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a seller with a single item to price, a
buyer whose value for the item is drawn from a common prior distribution over n different
possible values, and a take-it-or-leave-it-offer protocol. A mediator with access to the buyer’s
type may partially reveal such information to the seller in order to further some objective such
as the social welfare or the seller’s revenue. We study how a limit on the number of bits of
communication affects this setting in two respects: (1) How much does this constraint reduce
the optimal welfare or revenue? (2) What effect does constraining communication have on the
computational complexity of the mediator’s optimization problem?
In the setting of maximizing welfare under bilateral trade, we exhibit positive answers for
both questions (1) and (2). Whereas the optimal unconstrained scheme may involve n signals
(and thus log(n) bits of communication), we show that O(log(n) log 1
ǫ
) signals suffice for a 1− ǫ
approximation to the optimal welfare, and this bound is tight. This largely justifies the design
of algorithms for signaling subject to drastic limits on communication. As our main result, we
exhibit an efficient algorithm for computing a M−1
M
· (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the welfare-
maximizing scheme with at most M signals. This result hinges on an intricate submodularity
argument which relies on the optimality of a greedy algorithm for solving a certain linear pro-
gram. For the revenue objective, the surprising logarithmic bound on the number of signals does
not carry over: we show that Ω(n) signals are needed for a constant factor approximation to
the revenue of a fully informed seller. From a computational perspective, however, the problem
gets easier: we show that a simple dynamic program computes the signaling scheme with M
signals maximizing the seller’s revenue.
Observing that the signaling problem in bilateral trade is a special case of the fundamen-
tal Bayesian Persuasion model of Kamenica and Gentzkow, we also examine the question of
communication-constrained signaling more generally. Specifically, in this model there is a sender
(the mediator), a receiver (the seller) looking to take an action (setting the price), and a state
of nature (the buyer’s type) drawn from a common prior. The state of nature encodes both the
receiver’s utility and the sender’s objective as a function of the receiver’s action. Our results
for bilateral trade with the revenue objective imply that limiting communication to M signals
can scale the sender’s utility by a factor of O(M
n
) in general, where n denotes the number of
states of nature. We also show that our positive algorithmic results for bilateral trade do not
extend to communication-constrained signaling in the Bayesian Persuasion model. Specifically,
we show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender’s utility to within any constant
factor in the presence of communication constraints.
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1 Introduction
Strategic interactions are often rife with uncertainty and information asymmetry. Auctions and
markets on the Internet feature sellers with privileged information regarding their products, and
buyers with private information regarding their willingness to pay. The information structures
which govern these interactions play a key role in determining the equilibria of the resulting games.
In Akerlof’s market for lemons [1], for instance, information asymmetries between the buyers and
sellers of used cars — buyers cannot distinguish good cars from bad whereas sellers can — can
lead to the collapse of the entire market. In other cases, information asymmetries can serve a
useful purpose; for example, a seller of advertising impressions may conflate different impressions
in order to prevent “cherry picking” by advertisers, increase competition, and as a result increase
her1 revenue [21]. It is for these reasons that information structure design, also known as signal-
ing, is emerging as a new mechanism design for information. This new frontier, like traditional
mechanism design, raises deep algorithmic and complexity-theoretic questions whose exploration
has only recently begun (see, e.g., [6, 9, 11–13, 16]).
Perhaps one of the most fundamental economic interactions governed by the presence or absence
of information is bilateral trade between two parties [23]. In (a simplified form of) bilateral trade,
one side can choose whether to participate in the trade, and by doing so would generate a social
surplus which is private information to him. The other side can propose to take a fixed amount of
the social surplus. Two particularly natural instantiations of bilateral trade are the following:
1. Trade of an item between a seller (who has no value for the item) and a buyer via a posted
price. The seller’s posted price is the amount of surplus she proposes to take, while the
buyer’s valuation for the item, drawn from a commonly known distribution, is the amount
of social surplus the trade would generate. The buyer chooses whether to accept the seller’s
posted price. We call the resulting game the pricing game.
2. Trade between an employer and an agent:2 an employer would like to hire an agent to complete
a project, and has (known) utility u for its completion. The agent has a private cost c (drawn
from a known distribution) for completing the project, and the social surplus generated is
the difference u − c. Without knowing the cost of the agent, the employer posts a proposed
payment p, which is equivalent to posting the share u − p of the social welfare which she
proposes to keep. We call this game the employment game.
The buyer/agent is assumed to be rational with quasilinear utility, while the seller/employer
aims to maximize her own utility. The buyer/agent accepts an offer if he would derive non-negative
utility from it, and rejects it otherwise; this corresponds to the valuation exceeding the price in
the pricing game, and the payment exceeding the cost in the employment game. For concreteness,
we will state all of our results in the language of the pricing game; however, all results carry over
verbatim to the employment game, and we will occasionally remark on the interpretation of results
in this context.
The seller’s chosen offer price to the buyer depends on what she knows about the buyer’s value.
If the seller has no information other than the distribution Γ of values in the population of potential
buyers, she chooses the price P ∗ = P ∗(Γ) maximizing her revenue Rev(P,Γ) = P ·PrV∼Γ[V ≥ P ].
1For clarity, we will throughout use female pronouns for the seller and male pronouns for the buyer.
2In the literature, this falls into the class of principal-agent models. However, in this article, we use the word
“principal” for a different role, so we will use the non-standard nomenclature to avoid misunderstandings.
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This leads to a revenue of Rev(Γ) = Rev(P ∗(Γ),Γ) = P ∗ · PrV∼Γ[V ≥ P
∗] for the seller, and a
social welfare of Welfare(Γ) = PrΓ[V ≥ P
∗] · EV∼Γ [V | V ≥ P
∗] for both players combined. At
the other extreme is the case when the seller is fully informed about V . She can now set a price
P = V ; trade will always occur, leading to a maximum social welfare of EV∼Γ [V ], which is fully
extracted as revenue by the seller. Notice the difference caused by different amounts of information
being communicated: with no information, the social welfare can be arbitrarily smaller than with
full information.
In order to fully inform the seller, very fine-grained information had to be communicated. In
reality, for practical and logistical reasons, the information received by the seller about the buyer
is typically limited. For example, in the employment game, the information may be provided by
a university or certification agency, which may initially only be able to communicate a coarse-
grained rating of the agent via a GPA or the performance on a certification test. When the “agent”
provides a product (e.g., a piece of clothing or medication), the location or label it is sold under
(boutique/brand-name vs. discount/generic) sends a coarse signal to the potential employer/buyer
about the distribution of qualities she is to expect. Indeed, the study of communication constraints
and their impact on the outcomes of games dates back at least to the work of [4, 5] on communication
constraints in auctions.
How to optimally inform the seller with limited communication is the subject of the present
article.3 This question actually comprises two separate thrusts: (1) What is the inherent price of
limited communication? In other words, how much social welfare is lost because the principal can
only communicate limited information to the seller? A particularly stark version of this question is
the following: in the presence of a self-interested seller, how much social welfare can a principal sal-
vage by sending a single bit of information, which is equivalent to merely being able to exclude some
buyers from the market? (2) What are the algorithmic consequences of limited communication?
How well can the principal optimize the welfare with limited communication, if the computation
has to be efficient as well?
In order to formalize the notion of limited communication, we first define information structures.
At its most general, an information structure for the seller is a (possibly randomized) map ϕ from
the realized value V ∈ R of the buyer to a signal σ ∈ Σ presented to the seller. This in effect
partitions the probability histogram of Γ— or equivalently, the population of buyers — into different
segments, with each corresponding to a signal. Specifically, we write ϕ(v, σ) = Pr[ϕ(v) = σ | V =
v], where the randomness is over the internal coins of ϕ. Receiving signal σ induces, via Bayes’ rule,
a posterior distribution µσ for the seller, characterized by Prµσ [V = v] =
PrΓ[V=v]·ϕ(v,σ)
Pr[ϕ(V )=σ] ; here, the
randomness in the denominator is over both Γ and the internal coins of ϕ. Upon receiving σ, the
seller’s optimal price is P ∗(µσ) maximizing Rev(P, µσ). This price induces a revenue of Rev(µσ)
for the seller and a social welfare of Welfare(µσ). The expected revenue and social welfare over
all draws of the buyer’s value and randomness in the scheme ϕ are then given by Rev(ϕ,Γ) =∑
σ∈ΣPr[ϕ(V ) = σ] ·Rev(µσ) and Welfare(ϕ,Γ) =
∑
σ∈ΣPr[ϕ(V ) = σ] ·Welfare(µσ), respectively.
We now revisit our motivating examples. Suppose that the distribution Γ has support {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
Then, V can be precisely communicated to the seller by choosing a signal set Σ = {1, . . . , n} and
setting ϕ(vi, i) = 1 (and ϕ(vi, j) = 0 for i 6= j). By way of contrast, the signaling scheme commu-
nicating no information to the seller is implemented with Σ = {1} and ϕ(vi, 1) = 1 for all i. Notice
that the latter uses much lower “communication complexity,” as measured by |Σ|. Also notice
3 We note that an alternate interpretation of this goal is in terms of market segmentation. Specifically, how would
a market designer optimally partition the market into a limited number of segments?
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that both these extreme information structures are inherently algorithmically efficient: given an
explicit representation of Γ and a value V , it is trivial to compute ϕ(V ). For the design of signaling
schemes, we use the constraint that |Σ| = M , for a given bound M , as the “low communication
complexity” constraint.
We would like to understand the impact of the communication complexity on the social welfare
that can be (in principle) achieved, and to analyze the algorithmic question of computing optimal
signaling schemes ϕ with limited communication complexity. The “gold standard” for social welfare
is EV∼Γ [V ], which we will call the full-information welfare.
Formally, we are interested in the following questions: Given an explicit representation of the
distribution Γ and a bound M on the number of available signals, (1) What fraction of the full-
information welfare can be obtained by a signaling scheme with M signals? (2) Are there (approx-
imately) optimal and computationally efficient signaling schemes for maximizing social welfare?
Our Results
Our first main result (proved in Section 3) shows that signaling schemes even with an extremely
limited number of signals are surprisingly powerful in extracting welfare.
Theorem 1.1 For any distribution Γ with support size n, there is a single segment of the market
(i.e., a non-negative vector indexed by buyer types that is pointwise upper-bounded by the prior
over buyer types) with social welfare at least a Θ(1/ log n) fraction of the full-information welfare
EV∼Γ [V ]. The Θ(1/ log n) bound is tight.
Notice that this result is quite surprising. There are value distributions (such as equal-revenue
distributions) under which the presence of a self-interested seller results in only a fraction 1/n of the
full-information welfare being realized. The theorem states that merely by excluding some buyers,
the principal can improve this bound to Θ(1/ log n). Perhaps a “natural” conjecture would have
been that using M segments, at most a fraction O(M/n) of welfare could be attained in the worst
case. The theorem and the subsequent corollary show that this conjecture is false. However, as we
will see shortly, it is in fact true for the objective of maximizing the seller’s revenue.
Applying Theorem 1.1 repeatedly yields Corollary 1.2, which shows that with a relatively small
number of signals, we can get arbitrarily close to the full-information welfare.
Corollary 1.2 For any ǫ > 0 and any distribution Γ with support size n, there is a signaling scheme
with O(log n log(1/ǫ)) signals which obtains a (1− ǫ) fraction of the full-information welfare.
In terms of the number of bits of communication required, Corollary 1.2 implies that commu-
nicating O(log log n + log log(1/ǫ)) bits extracts a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the social welfare that could
be extracted using log n bits.
Corollary 1.2 also has the following algorithmic implication: exhaustively searching over all
signaling schemes with Θ(log n · log(1/ǫ)) signals, one obtains a QPTAS (quasi-polynomial time
approximation scheme).
Obtaining a truly polynomial-time algorithm appears quite a bit more challenging, although
— as discussed in Section 8 — we currently do not have any hardness results, even for exact
optimization. Our main technical result is Theorem 1.3, which shows that one can obtain a constant
factor approximation to the social welfare in polynomial time.
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Theorem 1.3 For any M > 1, there is a polynomial-time M−1M · (1−1/e) approximation algorithm
for the problem of implementing a welfare-maximizing signaling scheme with at most M signals,
given an explicit representation of Γ.
The proof of this theorem is quite involved. At the heart of it is a proof that the social welfare
achieved from a set of signals is submodular. More precisely, the proof focuses on the social welfare
accrued from all but one signal (which we denote by ⊥ and call the garbage signal — it is a signal of
buyer types for which our solution will not be credited with any reward). Each non-garbage signal σ
induces an optimal equilibrium price P ∗(µσ) chosen by the seller. We can think of the computation
of ϕ as first choosing the set S = {P1, P2, . . . , PM−1} of equilibrium prices of the optimum solution,
and then choosing an optimal signaling scheme inducing these particular prices. The key insight
is that the optimum social welfare with price set S (and one garbage signal) is a monotone and
submodular function of S. This fact is proved as Theorem 5.1 in Section 5. The proof relies heavily
on a characterization of the optimal signaling scheme inducing the set S of prices. While it is easy
to see that, given the target prices S = {P1, P2, . . . , PM−1}, this optimal signaling scheme can be
computed using a linear program (see Section 2), we require a better characterization, and thereto
show (as Theorem 4.3 in Section 4) that it is also the output of a greedy algorithm.
Optimizing Seller Revenue
The reader may have noticed our focus on social welfare. Almost equally frequently studied is the
objective of maximizing seller revenue. It turns out that results for seller revenue are much more
straightforward, both technically and in terms of their implications. First, the communication
constraint can severely curtail the seller’s revenue: when the buyer’s value is drawn from an equal-
revenue distribution supported on a geometric progression of length n, the revenue-maximizing
signaling scheme with M signals recovers only an O(M/n) fraction of the full-information rev-
enue. On the other hand, computing the optimal signaling scheme for revenue maximization is
straightforward (see Section 6):
Theorem 1.4 The optimal signaling scheme for maximizing seller revenue groups buyers into M
contiguous segments by valuations, i.e., if the same signal σ is sent for buyers with valuations
v < v′, then σ is also sent for all buyers with valuations v′′ ∈ [v, v′]. As a result, there exists a
polynomial-time dynamic programming algorithm which, given an explicit representation of Γ and
a bound M on the number of signals, computes a signaling scheme maximizing the seller’s expected
revenue.
In the employment game, Theorem 1.4 confirms (for the purpose of employer utility maxi-
mization) the generally agreed-upon form of grading or performance evaluation, wherein the high-
est performers are grouped together in one category (‘A’), followed by the next highest category
(‘B’), etc. Such signaling schemes are generally not optimal if the goal is to maximize social
welfare, and indeed, the optimum signaling scheme for welfare maximization can be fairly com-
plex. As an example, consider a buyer distribution supported on types (1, 2, 3, 4) with proba-
bilities (2/12, 1/12, 2/12, 7/12), respectively. When M = 2 signals are allowed, the optimal sig-
naling scheme obtains full welfare by sending signals with posterior unnormalized probabilities of
(2/12, 1/12, 0, 1/12) and (0, 0, 2/12, 6/12).
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Bayesian Persuasion
While our main focus is on bilateral trade, the framework of communication-bounded signaling
naturally applies to other games as well. A more general setting has been termed Bayesian Persua-
sion by Kamenica and Gentzkow [18]: a sender observes a random variable capturing the “state of
the world,” and can send a signal to a receiver. The receiver, based on the received signal, chooses
an action. The utility of both the sender and the receiver depend on the state of the world and the
chosen action, and are not necessarily aligned. Thus, the sender’s goal is to design the information
structure such that the receiver will choose actions which are in expectation beneficial to him.
Notice that signaling in bilateral trade fits in this framework. In the pricing game, the seller is
the receiver, the buyer’s valuation is the state of the world, and the sender is a market designer with
the goal of maximizing the seller’s revenue or social welfare. In the employment game, the employer
is the receiver, the employee’s cost is the state of the world, and the sender is an educational
institution or crowdsourcing website aiming to generate welfare for its participants.
Our results for revenue in the pricing game already imply that the price of limited communica-
tion is high in some persuasion games. While it may be natural to conjecture that the submodularity
property carries over from bilateral trade to more general persuasion games, this is not the case:
we establish a strong hardness result for maximizing the sender’s utility in general. (A more formal
version of this theorem and the proof are given in Section 7.)
Theorem 1.5 For any constant c > 0, it is NP-hard to construct a signaling scheme approximating
the maximum expected sender utility to within a factor c, given an explicit representation of a
Bayesian Persuasion game and a bound M on the number of signals.
Related Work
Our focus is on the classical model of bilateral trade (see [23, Chapter 23]). Our choice of protocol,
namely the take-it-or-leave-it offer, is arguably the simplest mechanism for bilateral trade, and in
the case of the pricing game corresponds to the revenue-optimal mechanism by the classical result
of Myerson [24]. The study of the impact of auxiliary information on trade — also known as third
degree price discrimination — has a long history, starting at least as early as [26]. We refer the
reader to [3] for an in-depth look at this economic literature.
The work most directly related to ours is that of Bergemann et al. [3], who examine the effects of
information in the same pricing game. Their main result is a remarkable characterization of buyer
and seller expected utilities that are attainable by varying the information structure of the seller,
i.e., by segmenting the market and allowing the seller to price discriminate between segments. They
characterize the space of realizable pairs (r, u) for which there exists an information structure ϕ
such that the seller’s expected revenue is r and the buyer’s expected utility is u: (r, u) is realizable
if and only if r ≥ Rev(Γ) (i.e., the seller at least matches her “uninformed” revenue), u ≥ 0, and
r + u ≤ EV∼Γ [V ].
Implicit in [3] is a family of algorithms — parametrized by the distribution Γ and a realizable
pair of utilities (r, u) — which implement a signaling scheme ϕ realizing the pair of utilities (r, u).
When Γ is an explicitly-described distribution with support size n, the signaling schemes implicit
in [3] are efficient; their runtime is a low-order polynomial in n.4 However, the most interesting
4A particularly beautiful example of the schemes implicit in [3] is the greedy algorithm achieving r = Rev(Γ) and
u = EV∼Γ [V ]−Rev(Γ).
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signaling schemes implied in [3] — in particular those with largest and smallest u — use as many
signals as the support size of the buyer distribution Γ. This realization motivates our examination
of schemes with limited communication.
Roesler and Szentes [28] also study the impact of information revelation on bilateral trade.
In their model, the buyer can observe a signal of his value for the item, and will pay for it if
the conditional expected value is weakly larger than the price. The seller will choose the optimal
monopoly price according to the buyer’s information structure.
The signaling problem in bilateral trade is a special case of Bayesian Persuasion, as formalized
by Kamenica and Gentzkow [18], generalizing an earlier model by Brocas and Carrillo [7]. Instan-
tiations, variants, and generalizations of the Bayesian Persuasion problem have seen a flurry of
interest in recent years. For example, persuasion has been examined in the context of voting [2], se-
curity [27, 30], multi-armed bandits [20, 22], medical research [19], and financial regulation [14, 15].
Dughmi and Xu [12] also consider persuasion algorithmically. However, they focus on Bayesian
Persuasion without any communication constraint, but allowing exponentially (or infinitely) many
states of nature in the number of actions.
More generally, Bayesian Persuasion is a special case of optimal information structure design
in games. Recent work in computer science has examined this question algorithmically, mostly in
the context of auctions [6, 10, 11, 13, 16]. In all these works, the uncertainty (i.e., state of nature)
concerns the item being sold, rather than the type of the buyer as in our model. Nevertheless,
[10, 11] are related to our work in that they also examine communication-limited signaling schemes.
The work of Dughmi [9] examines the complexity of signaling in abstract two-player normal form
games, while the recent work of Cheng et al. [8] presents an algorithmic framework for tackling a
number of (unconstrained) signaling problems.
An analogy can be drawn between our work and some of the work on auction design subject to
communication constraints. Blumrosen et al. [5] study single-item auctions in which bidders can
only communicate a limited number of bits to the auctioneer. They show that even severe bounds
on communication only lead to mild losses in welfare and revenue. Moreover, they show that
bidders simply report an interval in which their value for the item lies when faced with an optimal
auction. Blumrosen and Feldman [4] study communication-constrained mechanism design in single-
parameter problems more generally, and examine necessary and sufficient conditions under which
a communication-constrained mechanism matches or approximates the optimal (unconstrained)
mechanism.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout, we use the following conventions for notation. Vectors are denoted by bold face. When
we write x ≤ y for vectors x,y, we mean that xi ≤ yi for all i. We will frequently want to reason
about the sums of entries of a vector over a given set of indices. We then write xI =
∑
i∈I xi. We
also apply this notation for elements of a matrix X = (xi,j)i,j , writing xI,J =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J xi,j. We
will particularly use this notation when I, J are (closed or half-open) intervals of integers.
2.1 Signaling Schemes
When constructing a signaling scheme, we assume that the distribution Γ of buyer valuations is
given explicitly as input. In particular, this means that it must have finite support of size n. We
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assume that it is given by the valuations v1 < v2 < . . . < vn, and their associated probabilities
p1, p2, . . . , pn, satisfying
∑
i pi = 1. We write v and p for the vectors of all these values and
probabilities, respectively.
In the introduction, for ease of exposition, we described a signaling scheme ϕ in terms of its
conditional probabilities ϕ(v, σ) = Pr[ϕ(v) = σ | V = v]. For the remainder of this article, we
use notation differing in two ways: (1) since all values are of the form vi, we can index the buyer
types by i instead of v, and (2) it is much more convenient to use unnormalized probabilities
instead of conditional probabilities: xi,σ = ϕ(vi, σ) ·PrΓ[V = vi] is the probability that the buyer’s
valuation is vi and the signal σ is sent. The signaling scheme is then fully described by the matrix
X ∈ [0, 1]n×M = (xi,σ)i∈{1,...,n},σ∈{1,...,M}, satisfying that
∑
σ xi,σ = pi. From now on, we will
therefore simply refer to the signaling scheme as X instead of ϕ.
We sometimes describe a signal σ in isolation by a nonnegative type-indexed vector 0 ≤ x′σ ≤ p.
We call such a vector a segment of the market p. Thus, a signaling scheme can be thought of as a
family of segments, one per signal, whose sum is the entire market p.
As discussed in the introduction, upon receiving the signal σ, the seller will choose a price P (σ)
maximizing P ·PrV∼µσ [V ≥ P ]. This price will always be one of the possible buyer valuations vi, as
any other price could be raised slightly without losing any buyers. Furthermore, by merging signals
with the same price into one signal, without loss of generality, there are no two signals for which
the seller chooses the same price [18]. Hence, any signaling scheme X induces indices k1, k2, . . . , kM
such that upon receiving signal σ, the seller chooses price vkσ . Without loss of generality, we can
rearrange the signals so that k1 > k2 > . . . > kM .
For any signal σ, the expected welfare resulting from σ under X is called the served social
welfare and defined as wX(σ) =
∑
i≥kσ
vi · xi,σ; the social welfare is then W (X) =
∑
σ wX(σ).
We call the singaling scheme X optimal for welfare ifX maximizesW (X). IfW (X) ≥ αW (X⋆),
where X⋆ is optimal for welfare, we call X an α-approximation signaling scheme for welfare.
2.2 Welfare and Sanitized Welfare
While our goal for most of this article is to maximize the social welfare, it turns out that a slightly
modified objective function is significantly more amenable to analysis, both in terms of positive
results for bilateral trade and the hardness result for more general persuasion. Specifically, there is
a designated garbage signal ⊥, and any welfare accrued when ⊥ is sent is discounted: we thus define
the sanitized welfare of X to be W˜ (X) =
∑
σ 6=⊥ wX(σ). By designating the signal σ minimizing
wX(σ) as the garbage signal, we observe:
Proposition 2.1 For all signaling schemes X, we have that M−1M ·W (X) ≤ W˜ (X) ≤W (X).
In particular, any signaling scheme X maximizing sanitized welfare to within a factor α also
maximizes social welfare to within a factor M−1M ·α. Since we will always focus on sanitized welfare
in the context of welfare maximization, to avoid having to write M − 1 for the number of signals
everywhere, we will explicitly assume that our signaling schemes can use M signals in addition to
the garbage signal ⊥.
2.3 Sanitized Welfare Maximization Given Price Points
Conceptually, the task of designing a good signaling scheme can be divided into two steps: (1)
Choose the seller’s price points k1 > k2 > · · · > kM for non-garbage signals; (2) Design a signaling
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scheme X maximizing W˜ (X) such that the seller’s best response to each signal σ is in fact kσ .
Given the chosen price point indices k1, . . . , kM , the goal of finding the welfare-maximizing
signaling scheme is characterized by the following linear program.
Maximize
∑M
σ=1
∑n
i=kσ
vixi,σ
subject to
∑M
σ=1 xi,σ ≤ pi for all i (probability)
vkσ ·
∑
i≥kσ
xi,σ ≥ vk ·
∑
i≥k xi,σ for all σ, k (revenue)
xi,σ ≥ 0 for all i, σ.
(1)
The probability constraints capture that we do indeed have a valid signaling scheme (with the
garbage signal being assigned all residual probabilities pi −
∑M
σ=1 xi,σ). The revenue constraints
capture that it is a best response for the seller to set the price point kσ when receiving the signal
σ.
Notice that for step (2), the LP (1) actually achieves the optimal solution for given price points.
The approximation is necessary because for step (1), choosing the optimal price points appears
more difficult.
2.4 Bayesian Persuasion
Bayesian Persuasion [18] is a natural and strong generalization of signaling in bilateral trade. The
game involves a sender and a receiver, and is characterized by the following: (1) a distribution over
states of nature ω ∈ Ω, (2) a set A of actions the receiver can choose from, and (3) utility functions
uS(ω, a), uR(ω, a) mapping the state of nature and action chosen by the receiver to the utilities
obtained by the two players.
To illustrate these abstract concepts, for the pricing game, the state of nature was the buyer’s
valuation, and the receiver’s actions were prices P . In the present work, we assume that the
distribution over states of nature is given explicitly by the vector p of probabilities pω.
As with the pricing game, the sender can choose a signaling scheme X = (xω,σ)ω∈Ω,σ∈Σ with
M signals. Upon receiving the signal σ, the receiver will choose an action a(σ) ∈ A maximizing
Eω∼µσ [uR(ω, a)], breaking ties in favor of the sender; here, µσ denotes the posterior distribution
over states of nature conditioned on receiving signal σ.
The sender’s utility from sending the signal σ is u(σ) =
∑
ω xω,σ ·uS(ω, a(σ)), and he would like
to maximize his overall expected utility U(X) =
∑
σ u(σ). As with the special case of social welfare,
we will mostly focus on the sanitized sender utility U˜(X) =
∑
σ 6=⊥ u(σ) of signaling schemes with a
dedicated garbage signal ⊥; by the same argument as for social welfare, the sanitized sender utility
is within at least a factor M−1M of the sender utility.
3 Welfare with Limited Communication
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 1.1. We then discuss some of its implications,
including Corollary 1.2 and a QPTAS for the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to
limited communication.
We begin by showing a special case of the theorem when each vi is a power of 2. We then reduce
the general case to this special case at a loss of a constant factor.
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Lemma 3.1 If each vi is a power of 2, then the ratio of the full-information welfare to the maximum
served social welfare of a single segment of the market is at most O(log n).
Proof. The lemma is trivial for n = 1, so assume that n ≥ 2. Let SW =
∑
i pivi be the full-
information welfare. First, we remove (i.e., exclude from the segment we construct) all types i with
pivi <
SW
n2 . Because there are at most n such types, this can decrease the full-information welfare
by at most a factor of 1− 1/n.
Now, we group all (remaining) types i into O(log n) bins according to pivi. Specifically, bin
Bj, j ≥ 0 contains all types i with pivi ∈ (
SW
2j+1
, SW
2j
]. Since pivi ≥
SW
n2
, there are at most 2 log n
bins. Thus, there is at least one bin Bj such that
∑
i∈Bj
pivi ≥
n−1
n ·
1
2 logn · SW. Fix such a j for
the rest of the proof, and define u = SW
2j+1
.
Let i∗ = minBj be the type in Bj corresponding to the smallest value. We define a market
segment q as follows: Let qi∗ =
u
vi∗
, let qi =
u
2vi
for all i ∈ Bj with i 6= i
∗, and let qi = 0 for i 6∈ Bj .
By definition of the bins, for all i ∈ Bj we have u < pivi ≤ 2u, and therefore pi/4 ≤ qi ≤ pi. In
particular, 0 ≤ q ≤ p, and therefore q describes a valid segment of p.
We next show that, when facing the market segment q, the seller will choose the price point i∗.
The seller’s revenue from choosing i∗ is at least qi∗vi∗ = u. On the other hand, for any i > i
∗, the
seller obtains revenue at most vi ·
∑
k≥i,k∈Bj
u
2vk
≤ vi ·
u
2vi
·
∑∞
k=0
1
2k
= u; here, we used that the
valuations are powers of 2. Therefore, vi∗ is the revenue-maximizing price for q. With the seller
choosing vi∗ as the price, the served social welfare of q is∑
i∈Bj
qi · vi ≥
1
4
∑
i∈Bj
pi · vi ≥
(n− 1)
8n log n
· SW ≥
1
16n log n
· SW .
Thus, q is a segment with served social welfare at least 1O(logn) · SW.
We utilize Lemma 3.1 to prove the upper-bound portion of Theorem 1.1. The idea is to round
down all valuations to the nearest power of 2 (losing at most a factor of 2 in the welfare), then
utilize Lemma 3.1 to construct a segment for the new valuation distribution achieving at least a
factor Ω(1/ log n) of the full-information welfare, and finally reconstruct a segment/signal for the
original distribution. For the matching lower bound, we use an “equal welfare distribution.”
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let v′j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, be the valuations of the original distribution, with
associated probabilities p′j. The new valuations are vi = 2
i, with pi =
∑
2i≤v′j<2
i+1 p′j. We allow
the index i to be negative for notational convenience. Let n denote the support size of p, and note
that n ≤ m. Because valuations were reduced by at most a factor of 2, the full-information welfare
of the new distribution is at least half that of the original one, i.e.,
∑
i pivi ≥
1
2
∑
j p
′
jv
′
j .
Let q be a single segment with served social welfare at least a 1/O(log n) fraction of the full-
information welfare of p. By Lemma 3.1, such a q exists. Let i∗ be the price point chosen by the
seller under q, and R the seller’s revenue. By optimality of i∗ for the seller, we get that
R = vi∗ · (qi∗ +
n∑
k=i∗+1
qk) ≥ vi∗+1 ·
n∑
k=i∗+1
qk = 2vi∗ ·
n∑
k=i∗+1
qk. (2)
Hence, qi∗ ≥
∑n
k=i∗+1 qk, meaning that at least half of the probability mass, and thus half
of the seller’s revenue R from q, comes from type i∗. Now define a segment q′ of the original
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type distribution p′ as follows. For type i∗, take a total of probability mass qi∗ from types j with
2i
∗
≤ v′j < 2
i∗+1. For all types i > i∗, take a total of probability mass qi/8 from types j with
2i ≤ v′j < 2
i+1, and for types j with v′j < 2
i∗ , set q′j = 0. Observe that the full-information welfare
of q′ is at least a 1/8 fraction of the served social welfare of q. It remains to show that a constant
fraction of that social welfare is above the seller’s revenue-maximizing offer price for q′, which we
do next.
First, note that the price 2i
∗
gives the seller a revenue of at least R/2, even just from all buyers
of types j with 2i
∗
≤ v′j < 2
i∗+1. Next, consider a price of v′j ≥ 2
i∗+1, say 2i ≤ v′j ≤ 2
i+1 with
i ≥ i∗ + 1. The revenue of such a price is at most
v′j ·
∑
k≥j
q′k ≤ 2
i+1 ·
∑
k≥i
qk/8 =
1
4
vi ·
∑
k≥i
qk ≤ R/4. (3)
Hence, no price v′j ≥ 2
i∗+1 can be revenue-maximizing for q′, and all types in the segment q′ with
value at least 2i
∗+1 are served. It remains to show that a constant factor of the remaining social
welfare — associated with values between 2i
∗
and 2i
∗+1 — is also served.
Because the price 2i
∗
dominates all prices v′j ≥ 2
i∗+1, the seller will choose some price j with
2i
∗
≤ v′j < 2
i∗+1, and the chosen price must give the seller revenue at least R/2. The calculation in
(3) implies that the revenue extracted from types j with v′j ≥ 2
i∗+1 is at most R/4. Hence, at least
a revenue (and thus also social welfare) of R/4 must come from types j with 2i
∗
≤ v′j < 2
i∗+1. By
construction, the full-information welfare associated with those types is at most 2i
∗+1qi∗ = 2vi∗qi∗ ,
which is at most 2R by (2). Consequently, at least a 1/8 fraction of the total social welfare
associated with those types is served, as needed.
In summary, q′ serves a constant fraction of the full-information welfare of q, which in turn is a
1/O(log n) ≥ 1/O(logm) fraction of the full-information welfare of the distribution p′. Hence, for
any distribution supported on m types, a single segment is enough to serve a 1/O(logm) fraction
of the social welfare.
To show that this bound is tight, we construct an “equal-welfare distribution” with the property
that no single segment extracts more than an O(1/ log n) fraction of the full-information social
welfare. Let vi = 2
i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and pi =
1
2i·(n−i)
for 0 ≤ i < n, with pn =
1
2n−1
= pn−1. Notice
that these “probabilities” do not sum to 1; we omit the normalization constants for legibility, since
they will cancel out in the subsequent calculations.
The full-information welfare of p is
∑n
i=0 pivi = 2 +
∑n
i=1
1
i = Θ(log n). Now consider any
segment q of p, and let vk = 2
k be the seller’s revenue-maximizing price for q. If k = n, the
served social welfare is vnqn ≤ vnpn = 2 = O(1), as needed. Assume now that k < n. For each
i with k < i ≤ n, the optimality of the price vk implies that viq[i,n] ≤ vkq[k,n], or equivalently
q[i,n] ≤
vk
vi
q[k,n]. By choosing i = k + 1, we get that q[k+1,n] ≤
vk
vk+1
q[k,n] =
q[k,n]
2 , and consequently
q[k,n] ≤ 2qk. We can now bound the served social welfare of q by a constant:
n∑
i=k
viqi = vkq[k,n] +
n∑
i=k+1
(vi − vi−1)q[i,n] ≤ 2vkqk + 2
n∑
i=k+1
(vi − vi−1)
vk
vi
qk
= 2vkqk
(
1 +
n∑
i=k+1
vi − vi−1
vi
)
= vkqk(n+ 2− k).
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Because qk ≤ pk, we can bound vkqk(n+ 2− k) ≤ vkpk(n + 2− k) =
n+2−k
n−k ≤ 3.
In summary, any single segment can obtain at most constant welfare, and thus at most an
O(1/ log n) fraction of the total social welfare for this instance.
To derive Corollary 1.2, simply pick segments greedily, always choosing the next segment to have
largest possible served social welfare. By Theorem 1.1, each subsequent segment obtains at least
a 1c logn fraction of the residual welfare at that point, meaning that after adding c log n log(1/ǫ)
signals, the fraction of the total welfare obtained by the signaling scheme is at least 1 − (1 −
1
c logn)
c logn log(1/ǫ) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Remark 3.2 One can obtain a positive result very directly when the ratio ρ = maxi vimini vi is bounded.
Group all buyers according to their values into log ρ bins: for u = mini vi, buyers with 2
ju ≤
vi < 2
j+1u are put into bin j, By considering each bin as a segment, we can see that the revenue
(also, the served social welfare) of each segment is at least half of the its full-information welfare.
Choosing the best M bins leads to a bound of Ω(min(1,M/ log ρ)). However, our result is of more
interest when the ratio between the largest and smallest valuations can be very large.
To get a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (QPTAS) for the problem of finding a
welfare-maximizing signaling scheme with at most M signals, consider a desired approximation
parameter ǫ. We distinguish two cases. If M ≤ c log n log(1/ǫ) (again, c is the constant in O(log n)
in Theorem 1.1), enumerate all possible choices of price points, and find the truly optimal one (i.e.,
there is no approximation factor lost in this case). Notice that there are at most
( n
M
)
= O(nM )
such combinations to consider, and for each of them, either the LP (1) or the greedy algorithm
(Theorem 4.3) allows us to evaluate the maximum welfare attainable with that set of prices. Thus,
the running time is quasi-polynomial for fixed ǫ.
When M > c log n log(1/ǫ), by Corollary 1.2, choosing the M price points greedily obtains a
(1 − ǫ) fraction of the full-information welfare. Thus, it certainly obtains the same fraction of the
maximum that could be achieved with M signals.
4 Sanitized Welfare Maximization with a Greedy Algorithm
In this section, we show that, given the set of price points, an optimal solution to the LP (1) (i.e.,
the problem of maximizing sanitized welfare) can be computed by a greedy algorithm constructing
the signals one by one. Besides the faster running time, the main value of the greedy algorithm
is as an analysis tool for the problem of choosing the (near-)optimal price points; the analysis for
that problem is carried out in Section 5.
We begin with an algorithm for constructing just one signal σ with a given price point k = kσ.
Let p′ be a vector of residual probabilities for buyer types, i.e., the probability of each type that
has not been allocated to any signals previously. Hence, 0 ≤ p′ ≤ p. The goal is to construct the
probabilities y for a single signal with price point k; that is, we require that 0 ≤ yi ≤ p
′
i for all
i, and the revenue constraint vk ·
∑
j≥k yj ≥ vi ·
∑
j≥i yj must be satisfied for all i. The revenue
constraint can be written as
y[i,n] ≤
vk
vi
· y[k,n] for all i. (4)
In an optimal (single) signal, for each i ≥ k, either Inequality (4) must be tight, or yi = p
′
i;
otherwise, yi could be increased, raising social welfare. For the same reason, yk = p
′
k. Because no
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buyer of type i < k will ever purchase at price vk, such buyers contribute 0 to revenue and (social
or buyer) welfare. Hence, without loss of generality, the optimum signal has yi = 0 for all i < k.
These observations suggest the following algorithm: Gradually raise yk from 0 to p
′
k. Simultane-
ously raise the yi for i > k in such a way that at all times, for each i, either yi = p
′
i or Inequality (4)
is tight. This is accomplished by raising the tail sums y[i,n] at a rate of
vk
vi
while y[k,n] is raised
at rate 1. Solving for the necessary rates of increase of individual yi gives rise to the algorithm
Construct-One-Signal.
Algorithm 1 Construct-One-Signal (k,v,p′)
y ← 0
I ← {i ≥ k | p′i > 0} {Throughout, I contains all types for which yi can still be raised.}
while k ∈ I do
m← maxi∈I i
ρm ←
1
vm
{Rate of increase that keeps Inequality (4) tight for m.}
for all i ∈ I \ {m} do
j ← min{i′ > i | i′ ∈ I}
ρi ←
1
vi
− 1vj {Rate of increase that keeps Inequality (4) tight for i.}
i∗ ← argmini∈I(p
′
i − yi)/ρi {Index for which p
′
i∗ = yi∗ will become tight first.}
α← (p′i∗ − yi∗)/ρi∗ {Amount of increase in yk until yi∗ = p
′
i∗ .}
for all i ∈ I do
yi ← yi + αρi
I ← {i ≥ k | yi < p
′
i} {Update the set of indices that can still be raised.}
return y
Our first lemma simply restates the revenue constraint, and captures the fact that if yi < p
′
i at
any time during the algorithm, then the revenue constraint (4) must be tight for i. The proof is
straightforward by induction on iterations.
Lemma 4.1 For all indices i and every step of the algorithm, y[i,n] ≤
vk·y[k,i)
vi−vk
.
Furthermore, if i ∈ I at some point of the algorithm (including at termination), then at that
point in time, vi · y[i,n] = vk · y[k,n]. The latter condition is equivalent to saying that y[i,n] =
vky[k,i)
vi−vk
.
The key property of the algorithm Construct-One-Signal is that it maximizes all tail sums
y[i,n]:
Lemma 4.2 Let y′ ≤ p′ be any signal. If k is the chosen price by the seller under y′, i.e.,
vk · y
′
[k,n] ≥ vi · y
′
[i,n] for all i, then y[i,n] ≥ y
′
[i,n] for all i ≥ k.
Proof. For contradiction, assume that y[i,n] < y
′
[i,n] for some i, and fix the minimum such i.
Let j ≥ i be the minimum index with yj < p
′
j ; note that such an index must exist, as otherwise,
y[i,n] =
∑
j≥i yj =
∑
j≥i p
′
j ≥
∑
j≥i y
′
j = y
′
[i,n]. As a result, the index j ∈ I at the termination of
the algorithm, implying by Lemma 4.1 that vk · y[k,n] = vj · y[j,n]. Now, we obtain the following
contradiction:
y[i,n] = y[j,n] +
j−1∑
i′=i
yi′ =
vk · y[k,n]
vj
+
j−1∑
i′=i
p′i′ ≥ y
′
[j,n] +
j−1∑
i′=i
y′i′ = y
′
[i,n].
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To construct a complete signaling scheme, we invoke the algorithm Construct-One-Signal
repeatedly, constructing the signals one at a time. The important part here is that the signals
must be constructed in decreasing order of the target price. The intuitive reason is that the
inclusion of high-value buyers in a signal makes a higher price more attractive to the seller, thus
posing additional constraints on the required probability mass of lower-valued buyers that must be
included. Thus, it is always better to include as many high-valued buyers in the high-priced signals
as possible, and this is accomplished by constructing those signals first. Hence, we assume that the
signals are sorted in descending order of their prices.
Algorithm 2 Construct-Signaling-Scheme (v,p, S = {k1 > k2 > . . . > kM})
p(1) ← p
for σ ← 1 to M do
xσ ← Construct-One-Signal(p
(σ),v, kσ) {xσ is column σ of the signaling scheme X’s
matrix.}
p(σ+1) ← p(σ) − xσ
return X
Theorem 4.3 The algorithm Construct-Signaling-Scheme solves the linear program (1) op-
timally.
The proof of this theorem proceeds by showing that an optimal solution X∗ for the linear
program (1) can be (gradually) transformed into the solution X constructed by the algorithm
Construct-Signaling-Scheme without decreasing its solution quality. It is technically fairly
involved, and given in Appendix A.
5 Submodularity of Sanitized Welfare
We prove that the sanitized welfare objective function W˜ (S) is a submodular function of the set S
of chosen price points. (There is also a garbage signal ⊥/∈ S.) Let S = {k1 > k2 > . . . > km} be k
price points. W˜ (S) is defined as the optimum solution to the LP (1) with the given price points.
We show the following:
Theorem 5.1 If S ⊆ T and k /∈ T , then W˜ (T ∪ {k})− W˜ (T ) ≤ W˜ (S ∪ {k}) − W˜ (S).
Theorem 4.3 states that the greedy algorithm solves the problem for S ∪ {k} optimally, but
the effects of adding k are subtle. It is fairly easy to analyze what happens in the iteration when
k itself is added: that the welfare increase is larger for S than for T is easily seen by a simple
monotonicity argument, captured by Lemma 5.3. However, the addition of k has “downstream”
effects. The construction of subsequent signals with price points kσ < k will now face different
residual probabilities, and the resulting reductions in those signals need to be carefully balanced
against the gains from the signal with price point k.
Part of the complexity arises from the rather complex construction of the signal for price point
k itself. It is captured by the algorithm Construct-One-Signal, which itself runs through
iterations in which different sets I of indices have their probabilities increased. In order to elimi-
nate this source of complexity, we will think of adding the signal with price point k “gradually.”
14
Specifically, we consider the execution of Construct-Signaling-Scheme in which the execution
of Construct-One-Signal for the signal with price point k may be terminated prematurely.
An upper bound B on the tail probability is specified, and Construct-One-Signal is stopped
when
∑
i≥k yi = B. After signal k is constructed in this modified way, subsequent signals will be
constructed normally by Construct-Signaling-Scheme.
A modification of the proof of Theorem 4.3 shows that this modified algorithm optimally solves
the LP (1) with the added constraint that
∑
i≥k xi,σk ≤ B, where σ
k denotes the signal whose price
point is k.
We write W˜(k,B)(S) for the sanitized welfare achieved by the optimum solution with a set of
signal price points S ∪ {k}, and the constraint that the probability mass for signal k is at most B.
Our main lemma is:
Lemma 5.2 If S ⊆ T , then for any k,B, ǫ: W˜(k,B+ǫ)(T )− W˜(k,B)(T ) ≤ W˜(k,B+ǫ)(S)− W˜(k,B)(S).
Lemma 5.2 implies submodularity quite directly, as follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let X and X̂ be the optimal signaling schemes with price point sets
S ∪ {k} and T ∪ {k}, respectively. By Lemma 5.3, when constructing σk and ωk, the residual
probability for σk is more than that of ωk; therefore, x̂[k,n],ωk ≤ x[k,n],σk by Lemma 4.2.
Consider gradually increasing B from 0 to x̂[k,n],ωk in increments of (varying) ǫ, as outlined
above. Subsequently, continue increasing B for X only. By adding up the inequality from
Lemma 5.2 for each such step, and noting that the subsequent increases of B for X can only
further increase the welfare of X, we obtain that W˜ (S ∪ {k})− W˜ (S) ≥ W˜ (T ∪ {k})− W˜ (T ).
Because the objective function is submodular (and monotone by Lemma 5.3), the greedy al-
gorithm is known [25] to give a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for the problem of maximizing W˜ (S).
Proposition 2.1 then implies that the same greedy algorithm gives a M−1M · (1− 1/e) approximation
for the objective of maximizing the social welfare W (S), proving Theorem 1.3.
The proof of Lemma 5.2 is technically quite involved, and given in Appendix B. The idea is to
first prove it for sufficiently small ǫ, which allows us to couple the executions tightly.
In particular, by comparing the solutions to the linear program (1), we can ensure that any
constraint that becomes tight in the solution for set T with bound B + ǫ, but is not tight with
bound B (and similarly for S) would not have become tight for any ǫ′ < ǫ. This will localize the
changes, and maintain the revenue indifference for the seller. By summing over all such iterations
(there will only be finitely many, because ǫ is chosen so that at least one more constraint becomes
tight), we eventually prove the lemma for all ǫ.
In the analysis, we are interested in four different signaling schemes, constructed by Construct-
Signaling-Scheme when run with different sets of price points and upper bounds B. We will
assume here that k ∈ S ⊆ T . Specifically we define:
• X = (xi,σ)σ,i: the probability mass of type i assigned to signal σ when the algorithm is run
with price point set S and an upper bound of B.
• X+ = (x+i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set S and an upper bound of B + ǫ.
• X̂ = (x̂i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set T and an upper bound of B.
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• X̂+ = (x̂+i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set T and an upper bound of B + ǫ.
A first step of the proof, which is both illustrative of the types of arguments made repeatedly
and implies monotonicity of the sanitized welfare W˜ (S) is the following lemma. It shows that if
more probability mass can be allocated for one signal, then the effect can never be a decrease in
the total allocated probability mass for any type of buyer.
Lemma 5.3 (Monotonicity) Let X, X+ be optimal signaling schemes for price point set S, with
signal set Q. Then, for any k ∈ S,B, ǫ, and any buyer type i, we have that xi,Q ≤ x
+
i,Q.
As a corollary, for any sets of price points S ⊆ T , and with Q and Q̂ as the respective sets of
signals, for any B and any buyer type i, we have xi,Q ≤ x̂i,Q̂.
Proof. Let σk be the signal with price point k. Let Q′ ⊆ Q be an initial segment of Q, i.e.,
σ′ < σ for every σ′ ∈ Q′, σ ∈ Q \ Q′. We prove by induction on |Q′| that xi,Q′ ≤ x
+
i,Q′ . The base
case Q′ = ∅ is trivial.
For the induction step, let σ′ be the largest signal in Q′ (i.e., with smallest price point k′), and
distinguish three cases. If σ′ < σk, i.e., before σk is constructed, the execution of Construct-
Signaling-Scheme is the same for the bounds B and B + ǫ, so xi,σ′ = x
+
i,σ′ , and the induction
follows directly.
When σ′ = σk, xi,σk is the result of Construct-One-Signal with an upper bound of B, and
x+
i,σk
is that with upper bound of B + ǫ. Until the tail sum reaches B, the execution is the same,
and subsequently, values can only be raised further for the execution with the bound B + ǫ. Thus,
xi,σk ≤ x
+
i,σk
, and again, the induction step follows.
For σ′ > σk, assume for contradiction that there exists an i such that xi,Q′ > x
+
i,Q′ ; fix the
smallest such i. Since pi ≥ xi,Q′ > x
+
i,Q′ , we get that the index i is in I for the execution with
upper bound B + ǫ all the way until σ′ is constructed, implying by Lemma 4.1 (and the revenue
constraint for the upper bound of B) that for all σ ≤ σ′,
x[i,n],σ ≤
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x[kσ,i),σ, x
+
[i,n],σ =
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x+[kσ,i),σ.
By summing over all σ ∈ Q′, we also obtain that
x[i,n],Q′ ≤
∑
σ∈Q′
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x[kσ,i),σ, x
+
[i,n],Q′ =
∑
σ∈Q′
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x+[kσ,i),σ.
By minimality of i, we have that xi′,Q′ ≤ x
+
i′,Q′ for all i
′ < i; summing these inequalities
gives that x[kσ,i),Q′ ≤ x
+
[kσ,i),Q′
. Similarly, for any initial segment Q′′ ( Q′, the strong induction
hypothesis implies that xi′,Q′′ ≤ x
+
i′,Q′′ for all i
′ (in particular, i′ < i); summing those inequalities,
and combining with the one just derived proves that x[kσ,i),Q′′ ≤ x
+
[kσ,i),Q′′
for all initial segments
Q′′ ⊆ Q′ (including Q′′ = Q′).
Because
vkσ
vi−vkσ
is monotone non-increasing in σ (recall that kσ is decreasing), we can apply
Lemma B.5 in the middle step of the following derivation:
x+[i,n],Q′ =
∑
σ∈Q′
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x+[kσ,i),σ.
Lemma B.5
≥
∑
σ∈Q′
vkσ
vi − vkσ
· x[kσ,i),σ, ≥ x[i,n],Q′. (5)
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Because xi,Q′ > x
+
i,Q′ , but x[i,n],Q′ ≤ x
+
[i,n],Q′, there must be some j > i such that xj,Q′ < x
+
j,Q′;
fix a minimal such j. This time, since pj ≥ x
+
j,Q′ > xj,Q′, we can apply Lemma 4.1 (and the revenue
constraint for the process with bound B + ǫ) to obtain that for all σ ≤ σ′,
vj · x[j,n],σ = vkσ · x[kσ,n],σ ≥ vi · x[i,n],σ, vj · x
+
[j,n],σ ≤ vkσ · x
+
[kσ,n],σ
= vi · x
+
[i,n],σ.
Solving for x[j,n],σ and x
+
[j,n],σ, we obtain that x[j,n],σ ≥
vj
vj−vi
·x[i,j),σ and x
+
[j,n],σ ≤
vj
vj−vi
·x+[i,j−1],σ.
Summing over all σ ∈ Q′ now gives us that
x[j,n],Q′ ≥
vj
vj − vi
· x[i,j),Q′, x
+
[j,n],σ′ ≤
vj
vj − vi
· x+[i,j),Q′. (6)
By the definition of i and j, we have that x[i,j),Q′ > x
+
[i,j),Q′; substituting this inequality into
(6) and canceling common terms implies that x[j,n],Q′ > x
+
[j,n],Q′. Now, we derive a contradiction
as follows: by Inequality (5), we have
x[j,n],Q′ = x[i,n],Q′ − x[i,j),Q′
(5)
< x+[i,n],Q′ − x
+
[i,j),Q′ = x
+
[j,n],Q′ < x[j,n],Q′.
6 Revenue in Bilateral trade
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.4, giving a straightforward dynamic program to compute a
signaling scheme maximizing the seller’s revenue. Before doing so, we exhibit an equal-revenue
distribution for which any signaling scheme with M signals only recovers an O(M/n) fraction of
the full-information welfare. Notice again the contrast to the case of welfare maximization, where
even one segment is enough to attain an Ω(1/ log n) fraction of the full-information welfare.
We define an equal-revenue distribution as follows. Let the valuations be vi = 2
i for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
and the probabilities pi =
1
2i+1
for 0 ≤ i < n, and pn =
1
2n . The full-information welfare is∑n
i=0 pivi =
n
2 + 1. However, for every segment q ≤ p, no matter what price vi the seller chooses,
the revenue cannot be more than vi ·
∑
j≥i pj = 1. Therefore, in the worst case, with M signals, the
seller can at best get an O(M/n) fraction of the maximum social welfare as his revenue, whereas
a fully informed seller would be able to extract the entire full-information welfare, as discussed in
the introduction.
Next, we turn our attention to the problem of computing the optimum signaling scheme for the
seller’s revenue. The key insight enabling a dynamic program is that the seller-optimal signaling
scheme partitions the buyer types into disjoint intervals, and allocates all probability mass for a
given interval to one signal.
Lemma 6.1 (Interval Structure of Seller-Optimal Signaling Scheme) W.l.o.g., the seller-
optimal signaling scheme X has the following form: There are disjoint intervals I1, I2, . . . , IM of
buyer types such that
⋃
σ Iσ = {1, . . . , n}, and for each signal σ, xi,σ = pi for all i ∈ Iσ (and
xi,σ = 0 for all i /∈ Iσ).
Proof. Let k1 > k2 > . . . > kM be the price points of the signals σ under X. We will show how
to transform X to the claimed form without decreasing the seller’s revenue.
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First, if xi,σ > 0 for some σ < M, i < kσ, then the buyers of type i will not buy when signal σ is
sent, contributing nothing to the seller’s revenue. Therefore, setting xi,σ = 0 instead does not lower
the seller’s revenue, and increasing xi,M by the same amount again cannot decrease the seller’s
revenue. Hence, we may assume that for all signals σ < M , we have xi,σ > 0 only for i ≥ kσ.
Next, if xi,σ > 0, then xi,σ = pi. We distinguish two cases: if there is unallocated probability
mass of type i, then xi,σ can simply be raised. If xi,σ′ > 0 for σ
′ > σ, we can lower xi,σ′ to 0 while
raising xi,σ by the same amount. Because σ < σ
′ ≤M , we have that i ≥ kσ , so the seller’s revenue
increases by xi,σ′ · (vkσ − vkσ′ ) ≥ 0.
So far, we have shown that the signals partition the buyer types into sets such that for each
buyer type, all of its probability mass goes to its unique designated signal. It remains to show that
the partitions are intervals. If not, then there would be two signals σ′ > σ and price points i < i′
such that xi,σ = pi, xi′,σ′ = pi′ . Then, reallocating the probability mass xi′,σ′ to signal σ instead
increases the seller’s revenue by at least xi′,σ′ · (vkσ − vkσ′ ) ≥ 0.
The dynamic program for segmentation into intervals is now standard. Let R(i,m) denote the
optimal revenue a seller can obtain from buyer types {i, i + 1, . . . , n} with m signals, when the
lowest price is vi. R(i,m) satisfies the recurrence R(i, 0) = 0 and R(i,m) = maxi<i′≤n
(
R(i′,m −
1)+ vi ·
∑i′−1
j=i pj
)
. The maximum attainable revenue can be found by exhaustive search of R(i,M)
over all i.
7 Hardness of General Persuasion
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 1.5 from the introduction. More accurately, the
following theorem shows the hardness of maximizing sanitized sender utility within any constant.
Theorem 7.1 Unless P = NP, for any constant c > 0, there is no polynomial-time algorithm
for the following problem. Given a Bayesian persuasion game (Ω,p, A, uS , uR) and cardinality
constraint M on the number of signals, construct a signaling scheme X using at most M signals
such that the sanitized sender utility U˜(X) under X is at least c · U˜(X∗), where X∗ is the signaling
scheme maximizing U˜(X).
Because the sender utility and sanitized sender utility are within a factor of M−1M of each other,
this implies the same hardness result for the sender utility, proving Theorem 1.5.
We prove Theorem 7.1 by establishing hardness for a game we call the Hypergraph Edge
Guessing Game (HEGG). There is a hypergraph H = (V,E) which is commonly known to the
sender and receiver. The state of nature is a hyperedge e∗ ∈ E, drawn from the uniform distribution.
The receiver has two types of actions available: trying to guess the hyperedge, or “hedging her
bets” by guessing a vertex v ∈ V . If she guesses an edge e, then she gets 1 if her guess was correct
(e = e∗), and 0 otherwise. If she guesses a vertex v, she gets 1/dv (the degree of v) if v is incident
on e∗, and 0 otherwise.
The sender’s utility is determined by the receiver’s guess. If the receiver guesses an edge, the
sender gets utility 0, regardless of whether the guess is correct. If the receiver guesses a vertex v,
the sender has utility 1/dv (the same as the receiver) if v is incident on e
∗, and 0 otherwise.
Since the sender has access to e∗, it is his goal to design a signaling scheme that narrows down
the possible states of nature for the receiver enough that she can get an incident vertex, but not
so much as to induce her to guess a hyperedge. This is accomplished by making the posterior
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distribution conditioned on any signal uniform across edges incident on a particular vertex. Ideally,
we would like this to be the case for all signals, but this may simply be impossible. However, we
can achieve it for all but one signal.
Definition 7.2 A signaling scheme X is vertex-centric if for all signals σ except at most one,
there exists a node v = v(σ) such that xv,e = xv,e′ for all hyperedges e, e
′ ∋ v, and xv,e = 0 for all
hyperedges e 6∋ v.
That is, in a vertex-centric signaling scheme, all but one signal induce a uniform posterior
distribution over edges incident on one vertex.
Lemma 7.3 For any signaling scheme X, there is a vertex-centric signaling scheme X ′ with
U˜(X ′) ≥ U˜(X), and which can be constructed from X in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider any signaling scheme X, characterized by the probabilities xe,σ that the state of
the world is e and the sender sends the signal σ. (Recall that these are not conditional probabilities.)
For each signal σ, there is a unique (after tiebreaking) action that the receiver takes, either a
hyperedge e or a vertex v. If the receiver chooses a hyperedge e, the sender’s utility is 0; for a
vertex v, it is u(σ) = 1dv ·
∑
e incident on v xe,σ.
Let ⊥ be the designated garbage signal; without loss of generality (by renaming), it minimizes
u(⊥). First, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the receiver does not choose a hyperedge for any signal
σ 6=⊥. Otherwise, since the sender’s utility u(σ) = 0, we could reallocate all probability mass from
σ to ⊥ without changing the sanitized sender utility; under the new signal (which is never sent),
the receiver w.l.o.g. plays a vertex.
Consider any signal σ 6=⊥, and let v be the vertex the receiver chooses in response to σ. First, if
there is any hyperedge e not incident on v with xe,σ > 0, we can safely lower xe,σ to 0 (reassigning
the probability mass to ⊥), without changing the receiver’s action (because e was not incident on
v, this change cannot make v less attractive), and without affecting u(σ).
Let d = dv be the degree of v, and e1, e2, . . . , ed the hyperedges incident on v, sorted such that
xe1,σ ≥ xe2,σ ≥ . . . ≥ xed,σ. If xe1,σ > xed,σ, then the receiver’s expected utility from choosing
e1 is xe1,σ, whereas her utility from choosing v is
1
d
∑d
i=1 xei,σ < xe1,σ. This would contradict the
receiver’s playing v.
Notice that the changes do not affect the utility under any signal except the garbage signal, so
the sanitized sender utility stays the same.
Now consider the following optimization problem: find a vertex-centric signaling scheme X with
a dedicated garbage signal ⊥ that maximizes the sanitized sender utility U˜(X). By definition of
a vertex-centric signaling scheme, xe,v = xe′,v for all hyperedges e, e
′ incident on v; we denote this
quantity by yv. Then, the probability of sending the signal inducing the receiver to choose v is∑
e∋v xe,v = dvyv, and the resulting sender utility conditioned on sending it is 1/dv . A vertex-centric
signaling scheme is entirely determined by the M − 1 vertices and their associated probabilities yv;
hence, the optimization problem can be expressed as follows.
Maximize ‖y‖1
subject to
∑
v∈e yv ≤
1
|E| for all e ∈ E,
‖y‖0 ≤M − 1,
y ≥ 0.
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The first constraint captures that the total probability of all signals sent when the state of the
world is e can be at most the probability that the state of the world is e, which is 1/|E|. Rescaling
all yv values by a factor |E| and removing that constant factor from the objective gives us the
following equivalent characterization.
Maximize ‖y‖1
subject to
∑
v∈e yv ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E,
‖y‖0 ≤M − 1,
y ≥ 0.
(7)
Notice that Program (7) would exactly be an Independent Set characterization if the yv were
restricted to be integral. The following lemma shows that the upper bound on the support of y is
enough to ensure that the optimal solution cannot be approximated to within any constant (when
the hyperedges are large enough).
Lemma 7.4 For any constant r ≥ 1, unless P = NP, the optimum solution of Program (7) cannot
be approximated to within a factor better than 1/r.
Proof. We give a reduction from the gap version of Independent Set. Given a graph G =
(V,E) and any constant ǫ > 0, and the promise that the largest independent set of G has size either
less than nǫ or more than n1−ǫ, it is NP-hard to answer “No” in the former case and “Yes” in the
latter [17]. For our reduction, we specifically choose ǫ = 1r+2 .
Given G, we create a hypergraph H = (V,E′) on the same node set, whose hyperedges are
exactly the cliques of size r + 1 in G, i.e., E′ = {S ⊆ V | S is a clique of size r + 1 in G}. The
constraint on the support size of y is M ′ = n1−ǫ. Notice that the reduction is computed in time
O(nr+1), which is polynomial in n for constant r. We will show that if G has an independent set
of size n1−ǫ, then the objective value of Program (7) is M ′, whereas if G has no independent set of
size nǫ, then the objective value is less than M ′/r.
First, suppose that G has an independent set S of size M ′. Consider the solution y to Pro-
gram (7) which sets yv = 1 for all v ∈ S, and yv = 0 for all others. Because S is independent in G,
it contains at most one vertex from each (r + 1)-clique; hence, the proposed solution is valid, and
it achieves an objective value of M ′.
Conversely, let y be a solution to Program (7), and assume that its objective value is at least
1
r ·M
′. Let S be the set of all indices v such that yv >
1
r+1 . Then, by the assumed lower bound on
the objective value, |S| ≥ M
′
r2
.
Consider the subgraph G[S] induced by S in G. By the constraint for each hyperedge, G[S]
contains no (r + 1)-clique; otherwise, the corresponding yv would add up to more than 1. Now,
Ramsey’s Theorem implies that G[S] contains an independent set of size Ω(n1/r), as follows. Recall
that the Ramsey Number R(r+1, b) is the minimum size s such that each graph of size s contains
a clique of size r+1 or an independent set of size b. Because R(r+1, b) ≤
(r+b−1
r
)
∈ O(br) [29], and
G[S] is a graph of size at least M
′
r2
not containing any (r+1)-clique, it must contain an independent
set of size at least Ω((M ′/r2)1/r) = Ω(n(1−ǫ)/r) = ω(nǫ). This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. The proof is now straightforward. Given an instance of the Indepen-
dent Set problem, we construct the instance of the HEGG according to the proof of Lemma 7.4,
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setting the allowed number of signals to M = 1 +M ′. Feasible solutions to Program (7) exactly
capture vertex-centered signaling schemes, and the objective value is the sanitized sender utility
(scaled by |E′|).
8 Conclusion
Our work raises several natural questions for future work. First, while we provide a constant-factor
approximation algorithm and a QPTAS for social welfare in the pricing game, we did not actually
establish NP-hardness. Is there a polynomial-time algorithm for maximizing social welfare subject
to limited communication? Could at least a PTAS or an FPTAS be obtained? For the more
general persuasion problem with limited communication, we establish that no approximation of
social welfare to within any constant is possible. Can this result be strengthened to logarithmic or
polynomial hardness?
In the present submission, we are focusing on maximizing seller revenue and social welfare.
Bergemann et al. [3] also consider maximizing buyer’s utility. It is not hard to see that given the
price points for each signal, the buyer’s utility can be maximized by a linear program very similar
to (1). However, it is not clear that the overall objective function is still submodular, or whether
a similar greedy algorithm to the one from Section 4 optimally solves the corresponding LP.
Beyond revenue and social or buyer welfare, one could consider other objectives for the prin-
cipal. While for full generality of the persuasion problem, our results preclude constant-factor
approximation guarantees, it would be of interest to identify other natural classes in which lim-
its on communication have mild consequences, and in which good signaling schemes with limited
communication can be designed efficiently.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.3
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3 The algorithm Construct-Signaling-Scheme solves the linear program (1)
optimally.
Proof. Let X∗ be an optimal solution for the linear program (1), and X the signaling scheme
constructed by the algorithm Construct-Signaling-Scheme. We will show that X∗ can be
(gradually) transformed into X without decreasing its solution quality, proving optimality of X.
First, we may assume without loss of generality that x∗i,σ = 0 for all i < kσ, since setting them
to 0 affects neither the objective value nor the constraints. Let xσ, x
∗
σ denote column σ of X, X
∗,
i.e., the vector of probabilities that constitute signal σ.
Assume that X 6= X∗. Let σ be the smallest index (i.e., with largest price) such that xσ 6= x
∗
σ.
Let i be minimal such that xi,σ 6= x
∗
i,σ. For notational convenience, since we will mostly focus on
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the signal σ, we write y = xσ and y
∗ = x∗σ. Let p
′ = p−
∑
σ′<σ xσ′ = p−
∑
σ′<σ x
∗
σ′ be the vector
of residual probabilities at the time that signal σ was greedily constructed. We now distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: yi < y
∗
i :
By Lemma 4.2, y[i,n] ≥ y
∗
[i,n], and because yi < y
∗
i , we get that y[i+1,n] > y
∗
[i+1,n]. In particular,
there must be an index i′ > i such that yi′ > y
∗
i′ ; let i
′ be the smallest such index. Let δ =
min(yi′ − y
∗
i′ , y
∗
i − yi) > 0.
We next show that under X∗, all signals combined must use all probability mass of type i′,
i.e.,
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i′,σ′ = pi′ . If this were not the case, then define ǫ = min(δ, pi′ −
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i′,σ′) > 0,
and consider modifying X∗ by updating y′i′ = y
∗
i′ + ǫ and y
′
i = y
∗
i − ǫ (and leaving y
′
j = y
∗
j for
all j 6= i, i′). By choice of ǫ, this new solution X ′ does not violate the non-negativity or total
probability constraints, and we claim that (1) it satisfies the revenue constraint (4) for all j, and
(2) its welfare is strictly higher than that of X∗.
To check the revenue constraints, notice first that the seller’s revenue under X ′ for indices j ≤ i
and j > i′ is unchanged, so (4) still holds for such j. It remains to consider j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , i′}. Fix
one such j. By definition of i and i′, we have that yj′ ≤ y
′
j′ for kσ ≤ j
′ < i′; in particular, we can
infer for our j that
y′[kσ,j) =
j−1∑
j′=kσ
y′j′ ≥
j−1∑
j′=kσ
yj′ = y[kσ,j). (8)
Because y[i,n] ≥ y
∗
[i,n] and yi ≤ y
∗
i −ǫ, and the definition of i
′, we get that for all j ∈ {i+1, . . . , i′},
y[j,n] ≥ y
∗
[j,n] + ǫ = y
′
[j,n]. (9)
Combining these two inequalities with the fact that X satisfies all revenue constraints, in particular
vj · y[j,n] ≤ vkσ · y[kσ,n], we get that
vkσ · y
′
[kσ,j)
(8)
≥ vkσ · y[kσ,j) ≥ (vj − vkσ) · y[j,n]
(9)
≥ (vj − vkσ) · y
′
[j,n].
Adding vkσ ·y
′
[j,n] to both sides now shows that X
′ satisfies the revenue inequality for j. However,
notice that the objective value has increased by ǫ(vi′ − vi), contradicting the optimality of X
∗.
Hence, we have shown that
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i′,σ′ = pi′ . We will show that there is another signal σ
′ > σ
such that we can redistribute probability mass between signals σ, σ′ without affecting either the
objective or the constraints, while making X∗ and X more similar.
Because yi′ > y
∗
i′ and
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i′,σ′ = pi′ , there must be a signal σ
′ > σ such that x∗i′,σ′ > xi′,σ′ .
Fix σ′ to be the smallest such index, and define ǫ = min(x∗i′,σ′ , δ). Consider the modified signaling
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scheme X ′ with
y′i = y
∗
i − ǫ,
y′i′ = y
∗
i′ + ǫ,
x′i,σ′ = x
∗
i,σ′ + ǫ,
x′i′,σ′ = x
∗
i′,σ′ − ǫ,
x′
j,σ′′
= x∗
j,σ′′
for all other j, σ
′′
.
Because this assignment only redistributes probability mass, the probability mass constraints
cannot be violated, and the social welfare stays the same. Non-negativity follows from the choice
of ǫ. That y′ satisfies the revenue constraints follows exactly the same proof as in the previous
definition of y′, because the adjustment is the same. Finally, for all j ∈ {i+1, . . . , i′}, the tail sums
of probabilities have decreased under σ′, implying that so has the revenue for those prices. This
means that all revenue constraints are also satisfied for σ′.
This modification makes yi and y
∗
i more similar, and repeating this procedure with another
signal σ′ as needed, they will eventually become the same.
Case 2: yi > y
∗
i :
Analogous to the first case, we will begin by showing that
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i,σ′ = pi. For contradiction,
assume that
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i,σ′ < pi, and let ǫ = min(yi − y
∗
i , pi −
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i,σ′). Define an improved
signaling scheme by setting y′i = y
∗
i + ǫ, and y
′
j = y
∗
j for all j 6= i.
The probability mass constraints are still satisfied, and nothing has changed for indices j > i,
so those revenue constraints are still satisfied. Next, consider an index j ∈ {kσ +1, . . . , i}. Because
i is the first index with yi 6= y
∗
i , we get that y
∗
[kσ,j)
= y[kσ,j).
By Lemma 4.2, y[i+1,n] ≥ y
∗
[i+1,n], and because yi ≥ y
∗
i+ǫ, we obtain that y[j,n] ≥ y
∗
[j,n]+ǫ = y
′
[j,n].
Combining this and the previous inequality with the revenue constraint for y at index j (namely,
that vkσ · y[kσ,n] ≥ vj · y[j,n]), we conclude — analogously to the previous case — that
vkσ · y
′
[kσ,j)
= vkσ · y[kσ,j) ≥ (vj − vkσ) · y[j,n] ≥ (vj − vkσ) · y
′
[j,n].
Adding vkσ · y
′
[j,n] to both sides now establishes that the revenue constraint is satisfied at index
j. Because the objective value strictly increased, we obtain a contradiction to the optimality of
X∗. Hence, from now on, we assume that
∑M
σ′=1 x
∗
i,σ′ = pi.
As in Case 1, there must be some signal σ′ > σ with x∗i,σ′ > 0. Our goal is again to increase
y∗i to make it closer to yi, and do so by reassigning probability mass from signal σ
′. However, in
this case, doing so involves a more careful reallocation of probability mass to ensure all revenue
constraints are satisfied. In fact, we will use the algorithm Construct-One-Signal to construct
a vector d describing the probability reallocation, and then set
y′ = y∗ + d,
x′σ′ = x
∗
σ′ − d.
The “residual probability vector” r in this case is defined as ri = min(x
∗
i,σ′ , yi−y
∗
i ) and rj = x
∗
j,σ′
for j 6= i. It captures the fact that we can at most reallocate all of the probability mass of x∗σ′ ,
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but also must ensure that the new signal satisfies y′i ≤ yi. Since the modified version of signal σ
must satisfy the revenue constraints with target price vkσ , we make this price the target of the
construction of d, by setting ui = vkσ , uj = vj for j > i, and uj = 0 for j < i. Then, the change
vector is defined as d = Construct-One-Signal(r,u, i). We now want to show that the signals
y′,x′σ′ defined above satisfy all constraints.
First, because probability mass only gets moved around between signals, the welfare stays the
same, and the probability and non-negativity constraints cannot get violated because Construct-
One-Signal at most uses rj units of probability in coordinate j. We therefore focus on verifying
the revenue constraints.
We begin with x′σ′ , which only saw its probabilities decrease. The seller’s revenue at the target
index kσ′ decreased by vkσ′ · d[i,n]. Consider any index j > kσ′ . The seller’s revenue at index j
decreased by vj · d[j,n]. If j /∈ I at the termination of the algorithm, then dj = rj , and x
′
j,σ′ = 0,
meaning that price j is no more attractive than j +1 or j − 1 to the seller. Otherwise, Lemma 4.1
implies that
vj · d[j,n] = uj · d[j,n]
Lemma 4.1
= ui · d[i,n] = vkσ · d[i,n] ≥ vkσ′ · d[i,n].
In particular, j cannot have become more attractive to the seller than kσ′ .
We next verify that the revenue constraints are also satisfied for the signal y′. Here, the seller’s
revenue for price point j increased by vj · d[j,n]. For all j > i, the algorithm Construct-One-
Signal ensures that vj ·d[j,n] = uj ·d[j,n] ≤ ui ·d[i,n] = vkσ ·d[i,n], so the increase in revenue is no larger
for price point j than for kσ. Thus, we have obtained the revenue constraint vkσ · y
′
[kσ,n]
≥ vj · y
′
[j,n].
By rewriting y′[kσ,n] = y
′
[j,n] + (y
′
[kσ,n]
− y′[j,n]) and rearranging, we obtain the useful form
y′[j,n] ≤
vkσ · y
′
[kσ,j)
vj − vkσ
. (10)
The slightly tricky part is the indices j ∈ {kσ+1, . . . , i}. While the probabilities y
′
j for j < i do
not increase, the tail probabilities y′[j,n] do by virtue of increases in y
′
j for j ≥ i; hence, we need to
also consider these price points. Fix such a j ∈ {kσ+1, . . . , i}. We will first show that y
′
[j,n] ≤ y[j,n].
Let i′ > i be a smallest index with yi′ < pi′ −
∑
σ′′<σ xi′,σ′′ . (If no such i
′ exists, then let
i′ = n+ 1.) We will first show that y′[i′,n] ≤ y[i′,n]. This holds trivially when i
′ = n+ 1. Otherwise,
we apply Lemma 4.1 to the construction of y, and obtain that that y[i′,n] =
vkσ ·y[kσ,i′)
vi′−vkσ
. Now, notice
that for all j′ ∈ {kσ , . . . , i
′ − 1}, we have that y′j′ ≤ yj′ , for different reasons.
1. For j′ > i, this follows because the definition of i′ implies that yj′ = pj′ −
∑
σ
′′
<σ xj′,σ′′ is as
large as it can possibly be.
2. For j′ = i, it follows because y′i = y
∗
i + ǫ ≤ yi.
3. For j′ < i, it follows because y′j′ = y
∗
j′ = yj′.
This implies that y′[kσ,i′) ≤ y[kσ,i′), and hence — using Inequality (10) — that y
′
[i′,n] ≤ y[i′,n]. Finally,
the previous three cases show that for the fixed j,
y′[j,n] = y
′
[i′,n] +
i′−1∑
j′=j
y′j′ ≤ y[i′,n] +
i′−1∑
j′=j
yj′ = y[j,n].
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Having shown that y′[j,n] ≤ y[j,n], we next apply Lemma 4.1 to y at price point j to obtain that
y[j,n] ≤
vkσ ·y[kσ,j)
vj−vkσ
. Combining this with the fact that y[kσ,j) = y
′
[kσ,j)
for j < i by the third case of
the above case distinction, we obtain that y′[j,n] ≤
vkσ ·y
′
[kσ,j)
vj−vkσ
, which is an equivalent way of rewriting
the revenue constraint.
Again, this modification makes yi and y
∗
i more similar, and repeating this procedure with
additional signals σ′ as needed, they will eventually become the same.
B Proof of Lemma 5.2
In this section, we provide a proof of Lemma 5.2, restated here for convenience.
Lemma 5.2 If S ⊆ T , then for any k,B, ǫ: W˜(k,B+ǫ)(T )−W˜(k,B)(T ) ≤ W˜(k,B+ǫ)(S)−W˜(k,B)(S).
We will prove this lemma for sufficiently small ǫ, which allows us to couple the executions
tightly; the inequalities can then be added to imply the lemma for arbitrary ǫ.
By comparing the solutions to the linear program (1), we can ensure that any constraint that
becomes tight in the solution for set T with bound B + ǫ, but is not tight with bound B (and
similarly for S) would not have become tight for any ǫ′ < ǫ. This will localize the changes, and use
revenue indifference for the seller. By summing over all such iterations (there will only be finitely
many, because ǫ is chosen so that at least one more constraint becomes tight), we eventually prove
the lemma.
In the analysis, we are interested in four different signaling schemes, constructed by Construct-
Signaling-Scheme when run with different sets of price points and upper bounds B. We will
assume here that k ∈ S ⊆ T . Specifically we define:
• X = (xi,σ)σ,i: the probability mass of type i assigned to signal σ when the algorithm is run
with price point set S and an upper bound of B.
• X+ = (x+i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set S and an upper bound of B + ǫ.
• X̂ = (x̂i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set T and an upper bound of B.
• X̂+ = (x̂+i,σ)σ,i: probability mass for price point set T and an upper bound of B + ǫ.
To avoid notational confusion, we will use σ to denote signals under the signaling scheme for
S ∪ {k} and kσ to denote their price points; signals under the signaling scheme for T ∪ {k} are
denoted by ω, and their price points by k̂ω.
Since we are interested in the change in the signaling scheme as we increase the bounds from
B to B + ǫ, we define δσi = xi,σ − x
+
i,σ and δ̂
ω
i = x̂i,ω − x̂
+
i,ω.
In order to understand the δσi better, consider the effect of changing the total probability
constraint for the signal with price point k from B to B + ǫ. When the signal with price point k
is constructed, we may now add some more probability mass for types i ≥ k. Subsequently, by
Lemma 5.3, the algorithm continues with less (or equal) residual probability mass for all types.
This might in turn mean that for later signals σ with price points k′ < k, the probability mass
for some type i might get used up earlier. In turn, this will speed up the addition of probability
mass for types i′ ∈ {k′ + 1, . . . , i− 1}. In a sense, what happens is that the additional probability
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mass for the signal with price point k “displaces” some of that mass from other signals, increasing
different probability masses.
Consider some signal σ ∈ Q. Let Q≤σ = {σ
′ ∈ Q | σ′ ≤ σ} be the set of signals constructed up to
σ. We are interested in which price points may change their overall allocation of probability in the
signals constructed up to σ as a result of the increase from B to B+ ǫ. Notice that the candidates
are only those that did not have their probability mass already used up when the construction
reached σ with an upper bound of B. To capture this, we define kσ < e
σ
1 < e
σ
2 < . . . < e
σ
mσ to
be the indices which still had probability mass available after signal σ was constructed, i.e., such
that xeσj ,Q≤σ < pe
σ
j
. For notational convenience, we define eσmσ+1 = n+1 and vn+1 =∞. Similarly,
define k̂ω < ê
ω
1 < ê
ω
2 < . . . < ê
ω
m̂ω
to be the indices with x̂
êωj ,Q̂≤ω
< pêωj .
We are particularly interested in indices whose overall total probability mass (at the end of
Construct-Signaling-Scheme) can increase. For ease of notation, we therefore define σ̂S =
max{σ | kσ ∈ S}, ω̂T = max{ω | k̂ω ∈ T}, and ej = e
σ̂S
j , êj = ê
ω̂T
j ; note that this implies xej ,Q < pi
for all j, and similarly for êj. One type i < k could also see an increase, namely, if the displaced
probability by an increase for a type i′ > k which eventually became saturated causes an increase
in probability mass for some later signal with target k′ < k. The only such target types would be
e0 = max{i ≤ k | xi,Q < pi} and ê0 = max{i ≤ k | x̂i,Q̂ < pi}, respectively.
Notice that by making ǫ small enough, we can ensure that x+eσj ,Q≤σ
< peσj and x̂
+
êωj ,Q̂≤ω
< pêωj for
all indices eσj , ê
ω
j and signals σ, ω.
Define ǫ to be the supremum of all such values. This choice of ǫ ensures that at least one of
the above inequalities becomes tight, but for any ǫ′ < ǫ, we have x+eσj ,Q≤σ
< peσj and x̂
+
êωj ,Q̂≤ω
< pêωj .
With the chosen ǫ, for the index (or indices) where the inequality becomes tight, we still have
a tight revenue constraint, because in the execution of Construct-One-Signal, the index was
removed from I at the same time as kσ, in the last round of the iteration.
By choosing the proper ǫ, at least one of eσj and ê
ω
j is removed from the index set for the next
larger value B′ = B + ǫ. Because there are only finitely many candidate indices, finitely many
updates will reach the B such that x̂k,ωk = pk when running with a bound of B. Beyond that value
of B, the signal ωk cannot be further raised.
As we argued above, the increase in probability mass for the signal with price index k will
reduce the probability mass available for other signals constructed subsequently in the algorithm
Construct-Signaling-Scheme. Let σ be such a signal, with price point kσ < k. A lack of
available probability mass for low-value buyer types when σ is constructed may make its target price
vkσ less attractive to the seller; to compensate, the signal must reduce the amount of probability
mass for high-value buyers it uses. The following lemma captures the necessary reduction.
Lemma B.1 Fix some signal σ, and let i < i′, j < j′ be indices such that each of i, i′, j, j′ is either
equal to k′ or to one of the eσj′′. Then,
δσ[j,j′)
1
vj
− 1vj′
=
δσ[i,i′)
1
vi
− 1vi′
. (11)
An analogous characterization holds for the êωj′′ and δ̂
ω
[j,j′).
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Proof. Let k′ = kσ . Because xeσj ,Q≤σ < peσj , we can apply Lemma 4.1 to the iteration in which
σ was constructed, and infer that for all j ≤ mσ,
vk′ · x[k′,n],σ = veσj · x[eσj ,n],σ, vk′x
+
[k′,n],σ
= veσj · x
+
[eσj ,n],σ
,
whence vk′ · δ
σ
[k′,n] = veσj · δ
σ
[eσj ,n]
follows.
δσ[eσ
j
,eσ
j′
) = δ
σ
[eσ
j
,n] − δ
σ
[eσ
j′
,n] =
vk′
veσj
· δσ[k′,n] −
vk′
veσ
j′
· δσ[k′,n] =
( 1
veσj
−
1
veσ
j′
)
· vk′ · δ
σ
[k′,n]
Hence,
δσ
[eσ
j
,eσ
j′
)
1
veσ
j
− 1
veσ
j′
= vk′ ·δ
σ
[k′,n+1) for all j < j
′ ≤ mσ+1, and it is easy to see that this calculation
applies for j = k′ as well.
Lemma B.2 The ej , êj , e
σ
j , ê
ω
j satisfy the following subsequence properties.
1. Each index êj also appears as an element in the sequence of ej .
2. Let k′ be a price point and σ, ω signals such that σ has price point k′ under X and ω has price
point k′ under X̂. Then, each index êωj also appears as an element in the sequence of e
σ
j .
3. If σ > σ′, then each index eσj ≥ kσ′ also appears as an element in the sequence of e
σ′
j . Similarly
for êωj and ê
ω′
j .
Proof. Let QS , QT denote the sets of signals corresponding to the price point sets S, T , respec-
tively.
1. By Lemma 5.3, applied to S ⊆ T , we get that xi,QS ≤ x̂i,QT , so whenever x̂i,QT < pσ, we also
have xi,QS < pσ.
2. Analogous to the first part after applying Lemma 5.3 with Q = QS≤σ and Q̂ = QT≤ω. The
corresponding price point sets are {kσ ∈ S | kσ ≥ k
′} ⊆ {k̂ω ∈ T | k̂ω ≥ k
′}, respectively.
3. Analogous to the first part after applying Lemma 5.3 with Q = QS≤σ′ and Q
′ = QS≤σ.
Lemma B.3 Let σ′ > σk be a signal constructed after the one with price point k. Then, the total
probability mass under signal σ′ for the “initial saturated segment” [kσ′ , e
σ′
1 ) cannot increase when
B is raised to B + ǫ. That is, δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
≥ 0. If furthermore, eσ
′
1 ≤ k, then δ
σ′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= 0. An
analogous statement holds for δ̂ω
′
[k̂ω′ ,ê
ω′
1 )
in place of δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
.
Proof. By definition of eσ
′
1 , all the probability mass for indices i ∈ [kσ′ , e
σ′
1 ) is used up by signals
1, . . . , σ′ under both X and X+. Hence,∑
σ≤σ′
x[kσ′ ,eσ
′
1 ),σ
= p[kσ′ ,eσ
′
1 )
=
∑
σ≤σ′
x+
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 ),σ
.
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Taking the difference and solving gives us that δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= −
∑
σ<σ′ δ
σ
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
≥ 0 by monotonicity
(Lemma 5.3).
We prove the second part of the lemma by induction over σ′ > σk. For the base case, let σ′ be
the least σ such that eσ1 ≤ k. Consider a signal σ < σ
′. If kσ ≤ e
σ′
1 , then part 3 of Lemma B.2 would
imply that eσ
′
1 also appears as a e
σ
j for some j; in particular, it would imply that e
σ
1 ≤ e
σ′
1 ≤ k,
contradicting the minimality of σ′. Hence, kσ > e
σ′
1 , meaning that no probability mass is allocated
to signals σ < σ′ for types [kσ , e
σ′
1 ). Because by definition, all probability mass for such types is used
up by signals up to and including signal σ′, we conclude that x[kσ′ ,eσ
′
1 ),σ
′ = p[kσ′ ,eσ
′
1 )
= x+
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 ),σ
′
,
and therefore δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= 0.
For the induction step, we use our result from the first part that δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= −
∑
σ<σ′ δ
σ
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
.
We will show that δσ
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= 0 for all σ < σ′. First, when kσ > e
σ′
1 , we get that x[kσ′ ,eσ
′
1 ),σ
=
x+
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 ),σ
= 0, implying that δσ
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= 0. Otherwise, when kσ ≤ e
σ′
1 , we first observe that
x[kσ′ ,kσ),σ = x
+
[kσ′ ,kσ),σ
= 0, so δσ
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
= δσ
[kσ,eσ
′
1 )
. Lemma B.2 implies that eσ1 ≤ e
σ′
1 , so we can
apply Lemma B.1 and the induction hypothesis to show that
δσ
[kσ,eσ
′
1 )
Lemma B.1
= δσ[kσ,eσ1 )
· (
1
vkσ
−
1
v
eσ
′
1
)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
veσ1
)
I.H.
= 0,
completing the proof.
We next get to the key lemma for submodularity. It compares the effects of the increase of ǫ
under S and T on the same signal σ. At a very high level, it says that the effects on σ in terms of
the allocated probability mass of low-value types is more severe for T than for S. The precise form
is a bit subtle. To avoid notational confusion, we will use σ to denote signals under the signaling
scheme for S ∪ {k} and kσ to denote their price points; signals under the signaling scheme for
T ∪{k} are denoted by ω, and their price points by k̂ω. Recall that signals are sorted by decreasing
price points, so that kσ+1 < kσ, k̂ω+1 < k̂ω. We frequently want to find, for a given signal ω, the
signal σ with closest greater (or equal) price point to k̂ω. Hence, for any signal ω under T ∪ {k},
we define ⌊ω⌋ = max{σ | kσ ≥ k̂ω}.
Lemma B.4 Let σk be the signal with price point k for S ∪{k}, and ωk the signal with price point
k for T ∪ {k}. Let ω′ ≥ ωk be any signal, with price point k′ = k̂ω′ . Then,
⌊ω′⌋∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ ,êω
′
j )
≤
ω′∑
ω=ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,êω
′
j )
.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on ω′. The base case ω′ = ωk is true because
Lemma B.1, applied with i = j = k, i′ = êω
k
j and j
′ = n + 1 implies that δσ
k
[k,êω
k
j
)
= δ̂ω
k
[k,êω
k
j
)
=
−ǫvk · (
1
vk
− 1v
êω
k
j
). We now focus on the induction step, and distinguish three cases.
1. If k̂ω′ /∈ S, then
∑⌊ω′⌋
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ ,êω
′
j )
=
∑⌊ω′−1⌋
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ,êω
′
j )
. By induction hypothesis, the latter is
at most
∑ω′−1
ω=ωk δ̂
ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
j )
. By Lemmas B.1 and B.3, δ̂ω
′
[k̂ω′ ,ê
ω′
j )
≥ 0, and adding this inequality
proves the induction step.
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2. If k̂ω′ ∈ S and e
⌊ω′⌋
1 ≤ k, then write σ
′ = ⌊ω′⌋. By Lemma B.2, êω
′
j = e
σ′
j′ for some j
′, so we can
apply Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.3 to conclude that δσ
′
[kσ′ ,ê
ω′
j )
= δσ
′
[kσ′ ,e
σ′
1 )
· ( 1vk
σ′
− 1v
êω
′
j
)/( 1vk
σ′
−
1
v
eσ
′
1
) = 0. As in the previous case, we get that δ̂ω
′
[k̂ω′ ,ê
ω′
j )
≥ 0, and adding both terms to the
inequality obtained from the induction hypothesis now completes the inductive step.
3. Otherwise, we are in the case that k̂ω′ ∈ S and e
⌊ω′⌋
1 > k; we again write σ
′ = ⌊ω′⌋. First, we
are going to show that the lemma holds for σ′ with j = 1. By Lemma 5.3, we obtain that
σ′∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ,êω
′
1 )
=
σ′∑
σ=σk
(
x[kσ,êω′1 ),σ
− x+
[kσ,êω
′
1 ),σ
)
≤ 0,
whereas by definition of êω
′
1 ,
ω′∑
ω=ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 )
=
ω′∑
ω=ωk
(
x̂
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 ),ω
− x̂+
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 ),ω
)
= p
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 )
− p
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 )
= 0.
Thus, we have shown that
σ′∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ,êω
′
1 )
≤
ω′∑
ω=ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
1 )
=
σ′∑
σ=σk
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
1 )
.
The induction hypothesis implies the same inequality with σ
′′
< σ′ in place of σ′, so that we
have for all σ
′′
≤ σ′:
σ
′′∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ ,êω
′
1 )
≤
∑
ω:k
σ
′′≤k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 )
=
σ
′′∑
σ=σk
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,êω
′
1 )
. (12)
To extend the result to j > 1, consider any signal σ ∈ {σk + 1, . . . , σ′}. By Part (2) of
Lemma B.2, êω
′
1 is equal to e
σ′
j for some j. Because e
σ′
1 > k ≥ kσ, by Part (3) of Lemma B.2,
both eσ
′
1 and ê
σ′
1 occur as e
σ
j , e
σ
j′ for some j, j
′. We are therefore allowed to apply Lemma B.1,
and we can write
σ′∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ ,êω
′
j )
=
σ′∑
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ ,êω
′
1 )
· (
1
vkσ
−
1
v
êω
′
j
)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
v
êω
′
1
),
ω′∑
ω=ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
j )
=
σ′∑
σ=σk
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
1 )
· (
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vêω′
j
)/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vêω′1
)
≥
σ′∑
σ=σk
(
1
vkσ
−
1
vêω′j
)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
vêω′1
) ·
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
1 )
.
Because êω
′
j ≥ ê
ω′
1 , the function x 7→ (
1
x −
1
v
êω
′
j
)/( 1x −
1
v
êω
′
1
) is increasing in x for x < vêω′1
.
Furthermore, by Inequality (12), we have domination of all prefix sums, so we can apply
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Lemma B.5 with aσ = δ
σ
[kσ ,êω
′
1 )
, bσ =
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
1 )
, and cσ = (
1
vkσ
− 1v
êω
′
j
)/( 1vkσ
−
1
v
êω
′
1
) to conclude that
∑σ′
σ=σk δ
σ
[kσ ,êω
′
j )
≤
∑ω′
ω=ωk δ̂
ω
[k̂ω,êω
′
j
)
, completing the inductive step.
Lemma B.5 Let a1, . . . , an and b1, . . . , bn be any numbers such that for all indices i ≤ n, the
prefixes satisfy that
∑i
j=1 aj ≤
∑i
j=1 bj. Then, for any coefficients c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn ≥ 0, we have
that
∑n
j=1 cjaj ≤
∑n
j=1 cjbj.
Proof. By defining cn+1 = 0, we can write cj =
∑n
i=j(ci − ci+1). Now, we get that
n∑
j=1
cjaj =
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=j
aj(ci − ci+1) =
n∑
i=1
(ci − ci+1)
i∑
j=1
aj ≤
n∑
i=1
(ci − ci+1)
i∑
j=1
bj =
n∑
j=1
cjbj .
The inequality followed by the assumption on the prefixes and the non-negativity of all the ci−ci+1
terms.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Let σk be the signal with price point k to which probability mass was
added. This addition can only lead to an increase in social welfare via an increase in buyer types
that were previously not allocated to any signal, meaning that we are interested only in types i with∑
σ xi,σ < pi. In addition to the indices ej defined earlier for j ≥ 0, define e0 > e−1 > e−2 > . . . to
be all of the indices i < e0 with xQ,σ < pi.
We will first show that those types i < e0 do not actually lead to any welfare changes under
X. Thereto, consider some type ej with j < 0. Under X, buyers of this type can only be allocated
to a signal σ with kσ ≤ ej . For all such signals σ, by definition, we have that e
σ
1 ≤ ej < e0 ≤ k,
so Lemma B.3 implies that δσ[kσ,eσ1 )
= 0. By Part (3) of Lemma B.2, ej and ej+1 also occur as e
σ
j′ ,
eσj′′ , so we can apply Lemma B.1 to conclude that δ
σ
[ej ,ej+1)
= 0, and by summing obtain that for
all i < 0, ∑
σ
δσej
(∗)
=
∑
σ
δσ[ej ,ej+1) =
∑
σ:kσ≤ej
δσ[ej ,ej+1) = 0
In the step labeled (*), we are using the fact that ei is the only index in the range [ei, ei+1) at
which the probability mass can increase, and the probability mass for no other type will decrease.
By Part 1 of Lemma B.2, the êj form a subsequence of the ej . To compare the effects of
changes in the welfare, we partition the ej into the segments formed by the êj ; formally, we define
⌊ej⌋ = max{êj′ | êj′ ≤ ej}. Let j
∗be the index j such that ej∗ = ê1.
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We can now express the change in social welfare when adding k to S as follows:
W˜ (X) − W˜ (X+) =
∑
j
vej
∑
σ≥σk
δσej
=
∑
j≥j∗
vej ·
∑
σ≥σk
δσ[ej ,ej+1) +
j∗−1∑
j=0
vei
∑
σ≥σk
δσej
(∗)
=
∑
j≥j∗
vej ·
∑
σ≥σk
δσ[kσ,e1) · (
1
vej
−
1
vej+1
)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
ve1
) +
j∗−1∑
j=0
vei
∑
σ≥σk
δσej
=
( ∑
j≥j∗
vej · (
1
vej
−
1
vej+1
)
)
·
( ∑
σ≥σk
δσ[kσ,e1)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
ve1
)
)
+
j∗−1∑
j=0
vei
∑
σ≥σk
δσej . (13)
In the step labeled (*), we applied Lemma B.1. We were allowed to do so, because ej+1 ≥ ej ≥
ê1 ≥ e1 ≥ k ≥ kσ , allowing us to apply Part (3) of Lemma B.2.
We first analyze the second term
∑j∗−1
j=0 vei
∑
σ≥σk δ
σ
ej . If ê0 is defined, then
j∗−1∑
j=0
vej
∑
σ≥σk
δσej ≤ vê0 ·
∑
σ≥σk
j∗−1∑
j=1
δσej = vê0 ·
∑
σ≥σk
δσ[kσ,ê1)
Lemma B.4
≤ vê0 ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,ê1)
.
Otherwise (ê0 is not defined), we will simply use the bound that
∑
σ≥σk δ
σ
[kσ ,e1)
≤ 0 by Lemma 5.3.
For notational convenience, in this case, we will write vê0 = 0.
We next consider the first factor of the first term of Equation (13). Because ej ≥ ⌊ej⌋, we
obtain that∑
j≥j∗
vej · (
1
vej
−
1
vej+1
) ≥
∑
j≥j∗
v⌊ej⌋ · (
1
vej
−
1
vej+1
) =
∑
j′≥1
vêj′ ·
∑
j:⌊ej⌋=êj′
(
1
vej
−
1
vej+1
)
=
∑
j′≥1
vêj′ · (
1
vêj′
−
1
vêj′+1
).
To analyze the second factor of the first term in Equation (13), we first apply Lemma B.1 to
rewrite
∑
σ≥σk δ
σ
[kσ ,e1)
/( 1vkσ
− 1ve1
) =
∑
σ≥σk δ
σ
[kσ,ê1)
/( 1vkσ
− 1vê1
). We also write
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,ê1)
/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vê1
) =
∑
σ≥σk
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vê1
)
≥
∑
σ≥σk
1/(
1
vkσ
−
1
vê1
)
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
.
By Lemma B.4, we have that
∑⌊ω′⌋
σ=σk
δσ
[kσ,êω
′
j )
≤
∑ω′
ω=ωk δ̂
ω
[k̂ω ,êω
′
j )
for all ω′ ≥ ωk.
We can therefore apply Lemma B.5 with aσ = δ
σ
[kσ,êω
′
1 )
, bσ =
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,ê1)
, and
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cσ = 1/(
1
vkσ
− 1vê1
), and conclude that
∑
σ≥σk
δσ[kσ,e1)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
ve1
) =
∑
σ≥σk
δσ[kσ,ê1)/(
1
vkσ
−
1
vê1
) ≤
∑
σ≥σk
1/(
1
vkσ
−
1
vê1
) ·
∑
ω:kσ≤k̂ω<kσ−1,k̂ω≤k
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,ê1)
≤
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vê1
).
Recalling that
∑
σ≥σk δ
σ
[kσ,e1)
/( 1vkσ
− 1ve1
) ≤ 0 by Lemma 5.3, we now put all of these inequalities
together, yielding that
W˜ (X)− W˜ (X+) ≤
(∑
j′≥1
vêj′ · (
1
vêj′
−
1
vêj′+1
)
)
·
( ∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vê1
)
)
+ vê0 ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
=
∑
j′≥1
vêj′ ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω ,ê1)
· (
1
vêj′
−
1
vêj′+1
)/(
1
v
k̂ω
−
1
vê1
) + vê0 ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
Lemma B.1
=
∑
j′≥1
vêj′ ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω[êj′ ,êj′+1)
+ vê0 ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ω
[k̂ω,ê1)
=
∑
j′≥0
vêj′ ·
∑
ω≥ωk
δ̂ωêj′
= W˜ (X̂)− W˜ (X̂+).
Finally, by noticing that the respective increases in sanitized welfare are the negatives of the
terms here (i.e., W˜ (X+) − W˜ (X) and W˜ (X̂+) − W˜ (X̂), respectively), we complete the proof of
Lemma 5.2.
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A note on the approximation with a single signal
for power law distribution
July 1, 2018
Suppose the value of the buyer v is drawn from a distribution D such that
Prv∼D[v ≥ x] = x
−p, with 0 < p < 1. Assume the support of distribution D is
[n], then we have
Pr[v = x] = x−p − (x+ 1)−p ≈ px−p−1
Pr[v = n] = n−p.
The social welfare from D is
n∑
x=1
Pr[v = x]x ≈
n−1∑
1
px−p + n1−p
≈
∫ n
1
px−pdx+ n1−p
=
p(n1−p − 1)
1− p
+ n1−p
=
n1−p − p
1− p
=
n1−p − 1
1− p
+ 1.
Consider a single signal of price x0, the probability mass of type x allocated
to the signal is
qx = Pr[v = x and signal is sent]
= Pr[v = x0]/(
1
x0
−
1
x0 + 1
)(
1
x
−
1
x+ 1
)
qn = Pr[v = x0]/(
1
x0
−
1
x0 + 1
)(1/n)
1
The social welfare obtained from the signal with price x0 is
n∑
x=x0
xqx = Pr[v = x0]/(
1
x0
−
1
x0 + 1
)(1 +
n−1∑
x=x0
x(
1
x
−
1
x+ 1
))
= r(1 +
n−1∑
x=x0
1
x+ 1
)
≈ r(1 + log n− log x0)
≈ px1−p0 (1 + logn− log x0)
where r = Pr[v = x0]/(
1
x0
−
1
x0+1
)
Now consider the the social welfare of the signal x as a function g(x) =
px1−p(1+logn− logx). The maximum of this function is obtained when log x =
logn− 11−p+1. When p < 1−
1
logn , we have x >= 1, so the signal is well defined,
with a social welfare of
pn1−p
ep(1− p)
which is a p
ep
approximation of the total social welfare.
Otherwise, when p > 1 − 1logn , the best signal price is 1, which results in a
social welfare of 2Pr[v = 1](1 +
∑n−1
x=1
1
x+1 ) ≈ 2Pr[v = 1] logn.
Assume p = 1− f(n), with limn→∞ f(n) = 0. We are going to characterise
the increasing speed of n
1−p
−1
1−p is actually in the same order of logn, so the
signal of price 1 gives constant approximation of the total social welfare.
Consider the limit limn→∞
nf(n)−1
f(n) logn , which is limn→∞ n
f(n). Notice that
when limn→∞ f(n) logn is finite, the limit limn→∞ n
f(n) = limn→∞ e
f(n) logn
is finite. So for f(x) ∈ 1Ω(logn) , the social welfare of price 1 is a constant
approximation for the total social welfare.
2
